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Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach, by Clifford Williams.
Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp vi + 189. $27.99 (paperback).
MARK S. MCLEOD-HARRISON, George Fox University
No one can fairly accuse Clifford Williams of working out his philosophical views in an ungrounded way. From tramping with hobos to interviewing people who walked away from suicide to writing on the role of
desire in religious belief, Williams’s work consistently pays attention to
how we actually live our lives. Yet his work is analytically clear, accessible
to folks outside the ivory tower, and informed by contemporary scholarship. Religion and the Meaning of Life is no exception.
William unravels a paradox wrapped around two poles: that we long
for meaning in our lives and that we so often don’t think about meaning.
Both poles of the paradox are connected in theistic belief. He assumes the
following: God exists, there is an afterlife with God, morality is objective,
and morality’s being objective is required for a meaningful life. He does
not assume that belief in God or the afterlife are necessary to live a meaningful life but argues for the “enhancement thesis,” viz., that meaningfulness in life is enhanced if one holds those beliefs and they are true.
Williams connects meaningfulness and the worthwhile but does not identify them. In addition, there is a clear link between the worthwhile and
good inner states in the context of the pursuit of a good life.
Chapter 1 asks why we should care about meaning, providing two
answers. First, we desire meaning and hence an expectation exists that
we should care about it. We have any number of desires that are, in effect,
desires for meaning. Some are for intrinsic goods, others for right pleasures. These often overlap. After detailing some of these—non-competitive
play, deep friendship—Williams notes deep longings, the sort of yearning attended by wistfulness and even melancholy when one doesn’t have
the desired thing. It is puzzling, given these deep longings, that one ever
feels indifferent to meaning in one’s life. Here Williams provides seven
reasons why one might feel indifferent: busyness, lack of energy, illness
and physical exhaustion, suffering, constricted circumstances, depression,
and unbelief in God. Recognizing that any one of us may experience these
states occurrently, we shouldn’t be surprised that some of us don’t seem
to care about meaning. On the other hand, caring about meaning is also
dispositional and so we should continue to be puzzled about the lack of
concern for meaning.
A second reason for caring about meaning: God made us with desires
for intrinsic goods and right pleasures and God desires that we fulfill our
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desires for a meaningful life. Further, God made us with a capacity for
desire fulfillment and fulfillment of such desires is itself an intrinsic good.
Chapter 1 continues by arguing that caring about meaning can be fit into
both duty and happiness-based moral theories, but it is most at home in
virtue theory.
Chapter 2 takes up the topic of boredom, distinguishing everyday from
existential boredom. The former is often situative, viz., where one loses
interest in the particular thing one is currently doing and hence loses the
desire to do it. The latter is the loss of desire altogether, or at least the
near-total loss of desire—one can be existentially bored and yet continue
to eat. But the most relevant issue is whether one has also lost one’s interest in being interested. Existential boredom occurs when one loses interest
in nearly everything but finds the situation intolerable because one wants
to be interested. Such boredom can bring terror which engenders dread,
suicidal thoughts, and agony (among other powerful states). I’ll return
to those states momentarily. To avoid boredom itself, one may use evasive tactics such as engaging in physical activities not, of course, because
one thinks them interesting but simply to avoid boredom. Williams notes
two tactics in particular: mental activity or moral/religious activity. Such
activities find a home in Sartre’s framework of bad faith where one spends
one’s life evading one’s responsibility.
Where evasion fails, however, one may face dread, agony, despair, frustration, rebellion, and suicidal thoughts. Using Camus’s Sisyphus as a foil,
Williams notes how Sisyphus cannot evade his situation. There is only the
rolling of the rock up the hill. Rather, he rebels, disdaining the gods, and,
according to Camus, “one must imagine Sisyphus happy.” That happiness, though, cannot be true happiness. Of course, such rebellion may be
against God. If the rebellion, dread, agony, and so forth are bad enough,
one might end one’s life. Such an act, however, cuts off the possibility of
answering “the call from eternity” to turn away from these negative states
and reengage meaningfulness. Williams points to Kierkegaard’s proposal
of several things that might help: the concern of inwardness, being willing to be transformed, enunciating what one is feeling, quietness, and a
longing for God. These are, respectively, a concern for one’s current state
of boredom, a fervent passion for change, putting into words and owning
how one feels, being quiet, waiting, not being distracted by the crowd, and
the belief that longing for God makes one more open to hearing from God.
Chapter 3 uses Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death to understand immortality projects and vital lies we use to deny the terror of death, understood
both as extinction and meaninglessness. Because of extinction at death,
one can never know if one’s life was meaningful. In response, we engage
in immortality projects, things that will turn us from being small to being
large. Making money, the use of technology, and, Williams adds, good
projects—ones designed to help others but which aggrandize oneself—are
examples. Such projects are often embedded in the “Reward Syndrome”
wherein one compares one’s projects to others’ projects. Becker suggests

BOOK REVIEWS

557

that most often immortality projects are one-dimensional when they could
be transcendent. But the latter would require belief in the transcendent
that Western culture has lost. This leads to the vital lie—self-deception
that we can overcome death by our activities.
The solution to all this is rebirth—a death to the self living-in-fear-ofdeath and rebirth as one who faces the truth. But Becker, according to
Williams, says little about engaging goodness rather than simply living in
tension with our own deaths and the inclination to lie to ourselves with
immortality projects. Following Kierkegaard, Williams suggests that three
things are necessary to engage goodness: increased attention to what is
good, redirection of one’s root desires, and humility.
Chapter 4 engages how to acquire meaning in one’s life, considering
four philosophical views about the acquisition, viz., achieving goals, being
creative, having certain virtues and emotions, and giving and receiving
love. Each of these ways is argued to be consistent with a theistic overlay and with each other. Chapter 5 asks whether and how the four ways
of acquiring meaningfulness can help defeat thoughts of suicide. Taking
on the project left unfulfilled by Camus’s thoughts on suicide, Williams
engages a pragmatic and helpful approach to those with suicidal thoughts.
Chapters 6 and 7 return to God and life after death arguing that existential boredom can be relieved, new virtues can be taken on, and one
can transcend oneself if God and the afterlife are real. Further, one who
doesn’t believe in either of these should want them to be true because they
enhance the meaningfulness of one’s life. Here we find the development
of Williams’s enhancement thesis. Often theists conclude that life without God would be meaningless whereas secular thinkers believe meaningfulness can be rooted without God. Williams argues that belief in God
enhances the meaningfulness of life. Meaningfulness comes in degrees
and there is an objective value framework. These are important because
Williams measures strength of meaning not against subjective likings but
the quantity of intrinsic goods.
Chapter 6 argues that, given the above assumptions, the meaningfulness of one’s life can be enhanced in various ways, including belief in God.
But such a being must also exist to ground an extension of meaningfulness.
Further, belief must be of a rich type, including that God is loving, made
humans for meaningfulness, and made us capable of loving God in return.
The difference God makes in one’s meaning “quotient” comes through an
additional total context (for how one should live life), additional emotions
and virtues (love for, gratitude toward, and awe of God, for example), satisfaction of the urge to transcend oneself (deep relationships with others,
including God), and a cure for existential boredom (by engaging the ways
of increasing meaning in the context of pleasing one’s Creator).
In an “existential move,” Williams argues that one who does not believe
in God should be distressed. One can deny the enhancement thesis, be
indifferent to it (even if it is true) or be distressed by it. Distress is the most
rational reaction, for by missing what belief in God brings, one is missing
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maximal excellence. Chapter 7 argues for a parallel enhancement thesis,
viz., that belief in, and the truth of, life after death enhances meaningfulness in this life. The chapter proceeds by considering how the same four
ways in which the meaningfulness of life can be enhanced by belief in God
can be increased by belief in the afterlife.
Chapter 8 responds to four obstacles—unconscious motives, the lure
of the crowd, dividedness, and constricted circumstances leading to suffering. Sometimes these are overcome, sometimes not. Chapter 9 attends
to how we should live so we can die well using Tolstoy’s The Death of
Ivan Ilyich. To prepare oneself to die well one should be aware and attentive, and develop traits opposite Ilyich. Don’t take inordinate delight in
the power to crush others, take disproportionate pleasure in the trivial, or
have excessive self-regard.
Now some comments and questions. First, the comments. It seems to me
that the enhancement thesis is generally correct. I thought for many years
that a life without both belief in, and the reality of, God would leave life
without meaning. My views have shifted and I think Williams’s enhancement thesis closer to the truth. My shift may have something to do with
my Christian commitments having wavered of late, but Williams’s winsome way of presenting his case is worth the read alone. Second, Williams
displays a good deal of insight into human nature in this work. Some of
that insight is no doubt learned from reading the existentialists but perhaps more comes from the fact that Williams appears to pay close attention to the people with whom he talks in his day-to-day life. Observations
based on those talks are used to good end in enlivening Williams’s arguments. Third, the author’s style is clear and easy to read, making the book
useful to a wide audience, certainly including, say, college sophomores.
Now the critical questions. Williams mentions, in parsing boredom,
those bored in that they’ve lost all desire including the desire to have
interests. Such people are not in existential boredom. They wouldn’t care
one way or another if life is meaningful. Perhaps they might not care even
whether they live or die. Such people are, in some sense, far worse off objectively than the existentially bored. Given Williams’s existential concerns
for real people, I wonder, for such people, would any of the arguments he
supplies work? Would such a person be capable of a meaningful life? The
truth of much of what Williams says seems to rely on the contingencies of
human personality. Are such people just beyond existential reach?
A second question is about the application of Kierkegaard’s suggestions
for overcoming existential boredom to move toward meaningfulness: the
concern of inwardness, being willing to be transformed, enunciating what
one is feeling, quietness, and a longing for God. It seems the ability to
use such “tools” depends on already having some sense of the meaningfulness of life. There is, perhaps, a hint of circularity here. This is tied to
the previous question. The existentially bored must, to be existentially
engaged, at least be worried about the fact they are not interested in much.
The ability to use these five tools of Kierkegaard seems to presume that
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one is sufficiently existentially engaged with interests that one would
not, in fact, be existentially bored or at least be prepared to overcome it.
But what then is the real difference between the tools and simply being
existentially bored?
A final question, and one that is quite personal, flows from my own life.
It’s always a little shocking to hear about a suicide, even when you didn’t
know the person. Let the reader be assured that I’m okay. Nevertheless,
my late wife took her life after 11 years of suffering with lupus and a host
of related illnesses. She was a Ph.D. candidate at Yale in history with a
promising career in front of her. She never finished, her illness making
her life smaller, seemingly, each day. She left me and our 11-year old son.
In her journal entries from the several weeks before she died, she talked
about going to see three people: her undergraduate mentor who had died
too young from complications of a lung illness, a favorite student of hers
who had died in a freak automobile accident six months before, and Jesus
who died for us all. So far as I know, she never doubted the reality of
God, period. Evil in her own life and that of others intensely bothered her.
She planned to dance with Jesus but not until they had a heart-to-heart in
which the God she loved explained why there was so much pain in her,
and others, lives.
She did not count her life as generally meaningless, but she did count
evil as raising questions about the meaning of an individual life and saw
that the presence of evil could disintegrate one’s soul. Although Williams
notes that evil raises questions about his work on meaning, he does not
take them up. But I wonder if he shouldn’t have added a chapter on the
subject. In the end, my wife lost hope, as her final note indicated. But it
wasn’t hope in God or hope in an afterlife she lost. She merely lost hope
of getting better in this life. The loss of that hope seemed to undermine her
commitment to stay alive and she took continuing in this life to be meaningless or at least pointless. Of course, I did not, and cannot, know her
final thoughts, but I knew her well. It appears that she exchanged what
she took, at its end, to be a pointless life for a better, more meaningful one.
I wonder, what would Williams have said to my late wife had he been able
to talk with her before she took her life? I’m guessing Williams might have
had some insightful, pastorally real, things to say. Or maybe he would
merely have sat with her in loving silence.
It’s hard, though, to write a silent book. And indeed, the book Williams
has written is not silent but filled with insightful observations, good arguments, and clear presentation.

